The tragic episode and aftermath that unfolded on May 31st, which resulted with nine casualties within the Mavi Marmara vessel, it was hard not to notice how Turkey’s condemning response was a declaration that it is now a rising player within the regional scale. With Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu calling Israel’s raid as “murder conducted by a state” and pressing the UN Security Council to lead an investigative inquiry into the matter, it was expected for Turkey’s to express their anger over the death of their own citizens. However, considerable attention should be given to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayypip Erdogan words and actions.
In a June 1st Turkish Parliamentary speech, Erdogan described Israel’s raid as a “massacre” and “piracy”, and strongly warned Israel “not to test Turkey’s patience” (Erdogan, 2010). In addition to the Turkish Prime Minister’s actions, he recalled Turkey's ambassador to Israel from his duties, canceled planned military exercises and other defense agreements, is on the verge of terminating its economic ties between the two nations, and turned a high profile regional summit, the “Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia” (CICA) which was hosted by Turkey, into a platform to bash Israel with other Middle Eastern leaders (i.e. Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), thus marginalizing Turkish-Israeli relations. As a result, Turkey’s newfound regional status as a power is strongly evident when Erodgan addressed U.S. President Barrack Obama that Israel is on the verge of “losing” its best friend within the Middle East, an indication that Turkey is no longer dependent on western powers (Frenkel, 2010). With Turkey displaying its new political capital, we must ask if it should fully concentrate its energy in support for the Palestinian cause such as the flotillas activists did. If so, should it make it as a focal point within the country’s foreign affairs?
The blame game
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s decision to send the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to board the Mavi Marmara was a strategic mistake. For one of many reasons, the flotilla was a non-combat vessel but rather a civilian ship carrying aid and peace activists’ that was sailing along international waters, hence not threatening Israeli sovereignty. Possible questions that a future UN inquiry should answer is did Barak and other high ranking Israeli defense officials venture into different options on safely stopping the flotilla and did their actions legally abided with naval maritime protocol? Unfortunately, Barak’s tactical mistake and unexpected bloodshed helped Hamas win a crucial public relations battle within the west over Israel’s policies on the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, if Israel truly valued its alliance with Turkey and wanted to resolve this fracas, the first step would had been for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to call for Barak’s resignation, which presently has not happen and least likely ever will.
However, the majority of the blame should not be aimed solely on Israel. The Turkish government, led by Erdogan’s moderate Islamic based Justice and Development Party (AKP), should had aggressively stopped the involved NGOs, such as the Turkish non-profit Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), from sailing to the Gaza Strip. Any legitimate government would never risk endangering their citizens by allowing them to travel to an area of conflict, especially to a war zone between Hamas-ruled Gaza and Israel. Instead, Erdogan and his Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have publically stated that the government could not have deterred the IHH’s intention in sending the aid flotillas. Regardless, the AKP’s true motive was not to stop the flotillas from sailing, but to politically capitalize on the IHH’s intentions to show supportive solidarity with Hamas, closely ally itself with its Middle Eastern neighbors by putting more pressure on Israel over the Palestinian conflict, and appease its conservative Muslim population.
As for the IHH, they too are responsible for the bloodbath that took place within the Mediterranean. Out of all of the aid flotillas, five out of the six ships did not experience any type of resistance between peace activists and IDF soldiers. From what the IDF has stated, they radioed approval for aid to be delivered as long as the flotillas followed their request of unloading their cargo at the Israeli port of Ashdod, which the flotillas complied with the exception of the Mavi Marmara where many members of the IHH were aboard (Joffe, 2010). Due to the IHH’s resistance to break the blockade at all possible costs, such a maverick attitude helped escalate the situation, thus foreshadowing the deadly events. This type of resistance led many to question whether the IHH’s motive was peaceful or not, hence creating criticism towards the IHH not just by Israel but from the Turkish populace. Many people question that if their mission was aimed towards peace, why were metal rods, sling shots, and knives were boarded within the vessel? Furthermore, seeing from released video from the IDF and pictures from those on board, why did the activists attack and stab IDF soldiers when they boarded rather than cooperate like the other five flotillas did? As previously mention, only a UN international inquiry will answer such questions.
The lesser of two evils
What Erdogan and the AKP led Turkish government must contemplate is should they fully support the IHH (whom many international intelligence agencies accuse it of having close affiliations with terrorist organizations)? A number of political analysts from key institutions (i.e. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Danish Institute for International Studies, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) accuse the IHH of having strong ties with militant Islamic groups such Hezbollah and Al-Qaida (IHH, 2010). Furthermore, the group previously fell under the scrutiny of Turkish security forces in the late 1990s,
“Who uncovered an array of disturbing items, including firearms, explosives, [and] bomb-making instructions in the organization's Istanbul offices. The Turks determined that the IHH's members were planning to join the mujahedeen in Bosnia and Chechnya, and that the president of the organization had worked to send men to Muslim countries for ‘jihad’, and transferred weapons to those countries. An analysis of the group's telephone records also revealed phone calls to an al Qaeda guesthouse in Milan, and Algerian terrorist networks in Europe… In 1999, following the disastrous earthquakes that struck northwestern Turkey, the Turkish government eventually banned the IHH from distributing aid, naming it as one of several ‘fundamentalist organizations’ that refused to provide information on its activities” (Kenner, 2010).
An organization filled with a history of strife with earlier Turkish governments, one must ponder how did the IHH was able to conduct such a controversial operation without government intervention under the current regime? Clearly, ever since the AKP-led government came into power, it has gradually help diminish Ataturk’s ideals of secularism within Ankara’s political culture.
To further complicate matters for Erdogan, influential Turkish religious leader Fethullah Gulen, a supporter for the AKP, disagreed with the actions of the IHH. In a June 4, 2010 Wall Street Journal interview, Mr. Gulen criticizes the IHH actions as "a sign of defying authority, and will not lead to fruitful matters" and further implied that “when a charity organization linked with his movement wanted to help Gazans, he insisted they get Israel's permission” (Lauria, 2010). For an organization that has a widely negative reputation within the intelligence community, and it’s actions criticized by an influential religious leader, it would make sense for Erdogan and the AKP to avoid political suicide in being fully align with the IHH or to allow it to dictate the nation’s political agenda.
References
Erdogan, R. (2010, June 1). Speech delivered by prime minister recep tayyİp erdoĞan at the ak
party parliamentary group meeting on 1 june 2010. Retrieved from http://www.akparti.org.tr/disiliskiler/speech-delivered-by-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-at-t_7034.html
Frenkel, S. (2010, June 3). Israel's strained relations with turkey could prove costly.
Miami Herald, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/03/1662388/israels-strained-relations-with.html.
IHH (İnsani Yardım Vakfı). (2010, June 9). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved June
9, 2010, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IHH_%28%C4%B0nsani_Yard%C4%B1m_Vakf%C4%B1%29
Joffe, J. (2010, June 6). Turkey is making a play for regional power. The Financial Times,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/681fae96-7195-11df-8eec-00144feabdc0.html
Kenner, D. (2010, June 2). How Extremist is the IHH, really?. Foreign Policy, Retrieved from
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/02/how_extremist_is_the_ihh_really
Lauria, Joe. (2010, June 4). Reclusive turkish imam criticizes gaza flotilla . The Wall Street
Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704025304575284721280274694.html
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