Turkey’s relationship with its main western allies has greatly suffered since the violent Israeli flotilla incident in which Turkey has minimized its relationship with Israel and defied both the United States and the European Union by voting no on United Nations sanctions towards Iran over its ambitious nuclear weapons program. Currently, Turkey is steering itself away from the west and aligning itself closer to the east with likes of Iran and Syria. Such actions are confusing many foreign policy analysts in both Washington and Brussels and are starting to question if the west has lost Turkey as an ally. On the possibility of losing Turkey, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has blamed the EU for neglecting Turkey’s aspiration for European membership, thus creating a discord between Europe and America. In regards to Turkey’s actions, the question in debate within foreign policy circles is should Turkey burn its bridges with its western allies and become closely aligned to its neighbors such as Iran, Syria, and Hamas?
The Rise of Turkey
Politically, Turkey can greatly benefit in changing the direction of its foreign policy initiative by focusing its energies with the Middle East and other eastern neighbors. With Turkey being the only free-market and democratic Muslim state within the Middle East, it can be the ideal practical model that Obama has praised during his 2009 speech in Ankara. Through Turkey’s “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy, which is “aimed at maximizing cooperation with its neighbors while minimizing problems in its surrounding regions” (Ulutaş, 2010, p.1), it should seriously consider being a member within the Arab League, where they will quickly become an influential player within the regional block due to its strong economy, advanced military, and its partnerships with the west such as NATO. In making things a bit more interesting, Turkey should try to forge a political and economic bloc bigger than the Arab League but also the European Union. By integrating the Arab League (i.e. North Africa and Middle East), non-EU Balkan states, Central Asia, and Caucasus, the area becomes a true “energy hub” but most important the “bridge between East and West” where all the pipes link into Turkey thus making it a leader. During my first visit to Istanbul in October 2009, I was mesmerized by the country’s strong private markets (i.e. financial, manufacturing, and retail), physical infrastructure, and public service sector, that I quoted to my Turkish colleagues that Turkey should not be a player within the region but rather a superpower within their sphere of influence which I termed it as the “Neo Pax-Ottoman”.
The Benefits of a “Neo Pax-Ottoman”
As a leader within the “Neo Pax-Ottoman” sphere, Turkey can contribute many positive democratic ideals to its neighbor states. A characteristic that a number of nations share within the sphere is that they are ruled by non-democratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, and Iran. Another characteristic that other nations share is that they are systemically unstable and vulnerable to domestic turmoil (i.e. Kyrgyzstan, Yemen, and Somalia). Turkey can heavily contribute in helping these nations by improving their political infrastructure, advocate both women’s and human rights, and minimize the influence of terrorist organizations within the sphere.
Economically, the “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy would benefit the partners within the “Neo Pax-Ottoman” where it increases “its economic cooperation with neighboring states, most of which are not integrated into the world markets” (Ulutaş, 2010, p. 3). Like the EU, Turkey can foster solid economic relations with its neighbors by eliminating trade barriers, promote free-enterprise, jump start neighbor economies through innovation, force governments to diminish income disparity per-capita, increase individual purchasing power, stabilize monetary policies, and create foreign investor confidence into the region. Under the “Neo Pax-Ottoman”, Istanbul will not just be a cultural capital but also the new Wall-Street within the region.
The Limitations of a “Neo Pax-Ottoman”
There are serious concerns and boundaries within the framework of the “Neo Pax-Ottoman” caused by the aims of the “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy. For one, Turkish motives into the region can meddle with the interest of the United States, Russia, and key Middle Eastern states. On the US perspective, they view Turkish efforts as intrusion in regards to the Kurdish matter in Northern Iraq, the nuclear weapons issue in Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many US foreign policy analysts argue that Turkey’s actions are complicating relations between the two states where it is forcing Washington to make the difficult decision of choosing allies without upsetting other regional partners. The US fears that Turkish involvement in northern-Iraq, in efforts to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), will strain relations with both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KPG), thus threatening the progress made within that country. As for the Iranian nuclear problem, the US rejected the dual Turkish-Brazilian treaty with Iran as over-appeasement in fulfilling Iran’s interest where it does not prohibit the Iranians from its nuclear ambitions but rather stall time to complete its potential nuclear capabilities. Lastly, from the recent flotilla incident and aftermath, the US feels Turkey’s actions are obscuring the complex Israeli-Palestinian peace process by “throwing more wood into the fire”, thus putting the Obama administration in a thorny position in making the Israelites feel they are losing a friend in the US, upsetting the Palestinians from making efforts to negotiate in peace talks, and harming their efforts in winning the trust of the Muslim world due to the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
As for Russia, they will view Turkish motives as a threat to their “post-Soviet” sphere of influence. The Russians view the former Soviet states within the Balkans, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia as the boundaries within their sphere. This is evident with the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict in which the Russian military intervene in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to protect Russian citizens living there. Furthermore, the current turbulence in Kyrgyzstan has prompted Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to call for calm within that state and contemplate on the possibility for military intervention. If Turkey decides to expand their reach into the Russian sphere of influence, there is a strong likelihood that relations between the two nations can be strained.
In regards to the Middle East, many Arab states will interpret Turkey’s intention with suspicion due to the history within the region where Turkey was once a colonial ruler during the Ottoman Empire. In addition, key oil-rich Arab States will view Turkey’s “Neo Pax-Ottoman” as a method to exploit their energy resources due to the country’s heavy dependence on both gas and oil. Another concern is the clash of religious ideas where many Arab states practice a conservative Islamic doctrine compare to Turkey’s secular state, founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, that abolished the Caliphate from power in 1924. Overall, Turkey’s interest in the region will clash with its “zero-problem-with-neighbors” policy by upsetting its neighbors, hence impeding Turkey’s ambition in becoming an influential leader within the region.
A New Economic Partner
Turkey’s economy has not greatly suffered from the current global crisis and according to World Bank numbers, “Turkey’s economy has now embarked on a recovery phase [from the 2008 global recession], with year-on-year GDP growth of 6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009” (The World Bank, 2010). In addition, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) explains that Turkey’s growth since 2009 is fueled by good export performance where “the GDP is projected to expand by 6.8% in 2010 and 4.5% in 2011” (OECD, 2010). In a April 2010 report from the Turkish Statistical Institute, the agency confirmed “that exports increased by 25.2% and reached to USD $9,466 Million while imports increased by 47.4% and reached to USD $14 922 Million compared with April 2009 with foreign trade deficit reached from USD $2.559 Million to USD $5.456 Million” (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010). The same agency reports that the majority of Turkish exports and imports with EU-member states accounts for USD $4.340 Million for April 2010, which increased by 26.1% from April 2009 making the export proportion for EU countries at 45.8% compare to 45.5% in 2009 (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010). The main partner countries for Turkey’s exports are Germany with USD $924 Million, which increased by 27.8%, followed by France at USD $534 Million, the United Kingdom at USD $531 Million, and Italy at USD $516 Million (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010). As for Turkish imports, the top countries are Russia at USD $2.034 Million, Germany at USD $1.355 Million Dollars, China at USD $1.251 Million, and the United States at USD $978 Million (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2010).
From the provided data, Turkey should seriously consider if embracing the east will be a prudent alternative for the west. Analyzing data from the European Commission, if Turkey decides to boycott the west by strongly aligning itself with the Middle East, a huge economic vacuum will be created. For example, let’s say Turkey replaces economic relations with both the EU and United States with Arab League member states, total trade relations with the latter will be totaled at 14% or 31.556 Mio Euros while the former is totaled at 46.6% or 105.075,9 Mio Euros (DG Trade Statistics, 2009). The below table is a breakdown of trade relations between Turkey and Arab League member states:
Arab League | ||
Countries | Mio Euros | % |
Iran | 6.954,4 | 3.1% |
United Arab Emirates | 5.892,3 | 2.6% |
Saudi Arabia | 3.752,7 | 1.7% |
Iraq | 3.559,9 | 1.6% |
Algeria | 3.315,0 | 1.5% |
Egypt | 1.610,4 | 0.7% |
Syria | 1.191,3 | 0.5% |
Libya | 959,1 | 0.4% |
Morocco | 896,3 | 0.4% |
Qatar | 838,6 | 0.4% |
Tunisia | 777,5 | 0.3% |
Lebanon | 573,6 | 0.3% |
Kuwait | 389,8 | 0.2% |
Jordan | 330,0 | 0.1% |
Bahrain | 274,5 | 0.1% |
Yemen | 240,6 | 0.1% |
Total: | 31.556 | 14% |
(Provisional Data, Source: DG Trade Statistics)
As a reminder, Turkey’s trade relations with the EU are at 93.949,7 Mio Euros or 41.7% and with the US at 11.126,2 Mio Euros or 4.9% of total trade.
As for International Direct Investment, similar to the findings within trade relations, the majority of foreign investment comes from the EU and US compare to the Middle East. Figures from Turkey’s Central Bank indicate that investment from both the EU and US declined between the years of 2009 and 2010 compare to the Middle East. An explanation for the decline in western investment is due to the impact of the global financial crisis. The below table is a breakdown the International Direct Investment by country:
International Direct Investment Inflow
(Provisional Data, Source: General Directorate of Foreign Investment) PLEASE SEE REFERENCES
In adding the direct investment for January to April 2010 for both EU (USD $1.088 billion) and US (USD $39 million), the total amount is USD $1.127 billion compare to the USD $78 million for the near and Middle Eastern Countries. Even with the decline in investment, the west is still a potent partner within the country when discussing both trade and investment. Economically, the data provided logically indicates that Turkey should not hamper relations with the west. By heavily aligning itself with the east, the idealistic “Neo Pax-Ottoman” block would be weak both politically and economically. Instead, Turkey should focus in maintaining a good relationship with the west, thus strengthening the bridge between east and west rather than razing it.
The Failure of the “Zero-Problems-with-Neighbors” Policy
Unfortunately, Turkey’s “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy of establishing good relations with its neighbors in the region has stirred further problems. In addition to Turkey’s turbulent relationship with Israel, problems still continue to linger with Armenia, Greece, and Iraq. Currently, efforts to normalize relations with Armenia have been suspended due to disagreements regarding the unresolved conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the recognition of the Armenian genocide. Even though relations with Greece are good, the Cyprus issue still continues to persist due to the lack of substantial progress in reunifying the island. As for Iraq, Baghdad views Turkey’s incursion into northern Iraq, in an effort curb PKK activities, as a violation of its sovereignty. Even though the PKK is a domestic problem, the Turkish government argues that the terrorist organization uses northern Iraq as a base to launch attacks against Turkish citizens. Overall, it is vital that Turkey tries to resolve these long existing problems with its neighbors if it wants to advance as a leader within both the region and international spectrum.
“Peace at Home and Peace Aboard”
With Turkey’s international rise in status, the nation still has many domestic dilemmas to focus on. Economically, the country is experiencing a 6% annual growth but at the same time suffers from a 14.4% unemployment rate (Anatolia News Agency, 2010). Moreover, economists has expressed that Turkey should address the “skills mismatches within the labor market through improved education and training” (The World Bank, 2010). An investment within the labor market will be helpful due to the nation’s transformation from a heavily dependent agricultural and manufacturing economy to a service sector and technological one.
Politically, there are several significant issues that can hinder the stability of the nation. One issue involves eliminating the terrorist insurgency of the PKK which the Turkish military has been fighting with in the southeast region of the country since 1984. Another concern is the ruling party’s, Justice and Development Party (AKP), relationship with the military; in February 2010, authorities arrested 49 military officers over a suspected coup plot against the AKP. The last troublesome political issue facing Turkey is the AKP’s September 19 referendum to change the country’s constitution, which was ratified in 1982 during the military junta of the early 1980s. Leaders within the AKP argue that constitutional reforms are needed to advance democracy and obtain EU membership. However, the opposition disagrees with the AKP’s intention for reform and considers their attempts as a method to consolidate power from state institutions and separate powers between the executive and judiciary (Strauss, 2010).
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